Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pro se Defendant Mary Y. Seguin challenged a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on her counterclaim in this collection action. In late 2001, Seguin retained the law firm to represent her in two Rhode Island Family Court matters, a divorce action involving her former husband, Marc Seguin, and a paternity action involving her former boss at a prior place of employment. The law firm entered its appearance in both cases. Soon thereafter, Defendant received a large cash settlement from her former employer. Mr. Seguin successfully entreated a Family Court justice to impound the settlement as a marital asset and to place the funds in an escrow account with the children's guardian ad litem. Over the next year, litigation ensued in both Family Court matters; ultimately, the law firm withdrew as counsel for Defendant in the two cases, citing Defendant's repeated requests that the law firm file baseless motions, as well as her refusal to pay over $30,000 in legal fees for services rendered. Defendant and her former husband signed an addendum to their property-settlement agreement, which stipulated that any funds held in escrow were to be deposited in equal shares into irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the minor daughter fathered by Mr. Seguin. That August, both Seguin and Mr. Seguin requested, via correspondence to the law firm, that the law firm release all escrowed funds to them personally. However, the law firm declined to honor that request based on the addendum's provision that the escrow funds be deposited into irrevocable trusts. After a repeated request from Defendant and her former husband coupled with the imposition of a Family Court sanction upon Defendant in the paternity action, the law firm filed a motion for instructions in the divorce action, seeking guidance from the Family Court in regard to distribution of the escrow funds at issue. A Family Court justice ordered the law firm to provide an accounting of the funds and to deposit them into irrevocable trusts as set forth in the addendum. The law firm complied by providing an accounting of the funds and deposited the money into two trust accounts. Subsequently, the law firm filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to recover unpaid legal fees. In response, Defendant filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim, setting forth fifteen counts against the law firm, including: (1) false advertising; (2) deceptive trade practices; (3) fraud; (4) wire fraud; (5) mail fraud; (6) RICO violations; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of fiduciary duty by trustee; (9) breach of trust; (10) grand theft; (11) tampering with/altering legal records; (12) legal malpractice; (13) negligence; (14) breach of contract; and (15) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After hearing from both parties, the motion justice concluded that Defendant had failed to meet her burden in opposing Plaintiff's motion. Defendant appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Defendant indeed failed to meet her burden to defeat Plaintiff's motion. View "Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John J. Tworog appealed two Family Court orders pertaining to his divorce proceedings with Defendant Dolores M. Tworog. John first appealed an order denying his motion to reopen the final judgment of divorce, alleging that the judgment was based on mistakes of fact and fraud. He also appealed an order finding him in contempt of court for not complying with the final judgment of divorce. Upon review, the Supreme Court deferred to the hearing justice's findings of fact in this case, and with no abuse of discretion, affirmed the justice's decision to deny John's motion to reopen the divorce judgment. Furthermore, the Court found the record supported the hearing justice's finding of contempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Family Court orders. View "Tworog v. Tworog" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence. View "Hazard v. Hazard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Beth DePrete, appealed from an order of the family court reflecting the court's denial of her motion seeking leave of court to relocate the parties' two minor children from Rhode Island to Texas and seeking modification of the final judgment o divorce to reflect same. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court, holding that the family court justice (1) did not overlook or misconceive the evidence and was not clearly wrong in finding it was not in the best interests of the children to allow them to relocate to Texas; and (2) properly applied the criteria set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Dupre v. Dupre in determining whether relocation served the best interests of the children. View "DePrete v. DePrete" on Justia Law

Defendant Milton Pelosi appealed from two orders of the family court, an order denying Defendant's motion to vacate the entry of the interlocutory judgment and the final judgment of divorce and the order granting Plaintiff Kathleen Pelosi's motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal. On appeal, Defendant contended that he was never provided notice of (1) the entry of the final judgment of divorce, or (2) the hearing pursuant to which the amended final judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court dismissing Defendant's appeal, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in granting Plaintiff's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Defendant had failed to perfect his appeal. View "Pelosi v. Pelosi" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Krivitsky appealed pro se from two family court orders authorizing a commissioner to sell Defendant's real property to satisfy the child-support arrearage he owed to Plaintiff, Jo-An Krivitsky. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the family court, holding (1) the family court had jurisdiction to enter the appealed orders; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the family court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a commissioner to facilitate the marketing and sale of Defendant's property at a reasonable price; and (3) the hearing justice maintained the requisite judicial impartiality and Defendant's assertions that the hearing justice showed a bias toward Plaintiff and her counsel were without merit. View "Krivitsky v. Krivitsky" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a family court justice erred in finding that loans taken out by Defendant JoAnne Palin to pay for the the college educations of her and Plaintiff Steven Palin's children were not marital debt. JoAnne argued on appeal that the loans at issue should have been considered marital debt by the trial justice because they were incurred during the marriage and were for the benefit of the couple's children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the trial justice's findings that JoAnne's testimony was less than credible, the loans were signed by JoAnne without Steven's consent, the documentary evidence of the loans was never introduced into evidence as to whether the loans were actually for the benefit of either child, and at the time the loans were taken out, the family was in dire financial straits, the trial justice's exclusion of these loans from the marital estate was a sustainable exercise of his discretion to classify and assign marital debts. View "Palin v. Palin" on Justia Law

The family court terminated Father's parental rights to his daughter, Gabrielle D., after Gabrielle had been placed with the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) for at least twelve months. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not clearly err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Gabrielle and Father pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(3); and (2) as Father's remaining allegations of error involved statutory provisions other than section 15-7-7(a)(3), and in view of the Court's holding that the trial justice did not clearly err with respect to section 15-7-7(a)(3)'s reasonable efforts requirement, the other claims of error did not need to be addressed. View "In re Gabrielle D." on Justia Law

Former spouses disputed the property settlement agreement that was entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around a minority interest in Prime Time Manufacturing, Inc. The agreement specified that Husband would retain his twenty-five percent ownership interest in Prime Time. After the agreement was approved but before final judgment was entered, Joseph learned that his ownership interest was worth significantly more than the value upon which the parties had agreed. Sharon Esposito moved to reform the agreement or vacate the judgment, which motion was denied by the family court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the agreement was fair and equitable when the parties entered into it, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sharon's motion to vacate. View "Esposito v. Esposito" on Justia Law

The family court terminated Father's parental rights with respect to Daughter. Father appealed, arguing that the justice of the family court (1) improperly admitted into evidence certain exhibits during the trial, and (2) erred in terminating Father's parental rights because there was insufficient evidence in the record of cruel and abusive conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court, holding (1) Father waived his right to appeal the admission into evidence of the exhibits, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial justice's findings and the justice's conclusion that Father committed, or allowed to be committed, cruel and abusive conduct. View "In re Jazlyn P." on Justia Law