Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brian Krivitsky appealed pro se from two family court orders authorizing a commissioner to sell Defendant's real property to satisfy the child-support arrearage he owed to Plaintiff, Jo-An Krivitsky. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the family court, holding (1) the family court had jurisdiction to enter the appealed orders; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the family court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a commissioner to facilitate the marketing and sale of Defendant's property at a reasonable price; and (3) the hearing justice maintained the requisite judicial impartiality and Defendant's assertions that the hearing justice showed a bias toward Plaintiff and her counsel were without merit. View "Krivitsky v. Krivitsky" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a family court justice erred in finding that loans taken out by Defendant JoAnne Palin to pay for the the college educations of her and Plaintiff Steven Palin's children were not marital debt. JoAnne argued on appeal that the loans at issue should have been considered marital debt by the trial justice because they were incurred during the marriage and were for the benefit of the couple's children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the trial justice's findings that JoAnne's testimony was less than credible, the loans were signed by JoAnne without Steven's consent, the documentary evidence of the loans was never introduced into evidence as to whether the loans were actually for the benefit of either child, and at the time the loans were taken out, the family was in dire financial straits, the trial justice's exclusion of these loans from the marital estate was a sustainable exercise of his discretion to classify and assign marital debts. View "Palin v. Palin" on Justia Law

The family court terminated Father's parental rights to his daughter, Gabrielle D., after Gabrielle had been placed with the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) for at least twelve months. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not clearly err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Gabrielle and Father pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(3); and (2) as Father's remaining allegations of error involved statutory provisions other than section 15-7-7(a)(3), and in view of the Court's holding that the trial justice did not clearly err with respect to section 15-7-7(a)(3)'s reasonable efforts requirement, the other claims of error did not need to be addressed. View "In re Gabrielle D." on Justia Law

Former spouses disputed the property settlement agreement that was entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around a minority interest in Prime Time Manufacturing, Inc. The agreement specified that Husband would retain his twenty-five percent ownership interest in Prime Time. After the agreement was approved but before final judgment was entered, Joseph learned that his ownership interest was worth significantly more than the value upon which the parties had agreed. Sharon Esposito moved to reform the agreement or vacate the judgment, which motion was denied by the family court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the agreement was fair and equitable when the parties entered into it, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sharon's motion to vacate. View "Esposito v. Esposito" on Justia Law

The family court terminated Father's parental rights with respect to Daughter. Father appealed, arguing that the justice of the family court (1) improperly admitted into evidence certain exhibits during the trial, and (2) erred in terminating Father's parental rights because there was insufficient evidence in the record of cruel and abusive conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court, holding (1) Father waived his right to appeal the admission into evidence of the exhibits, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial justice's findings and the justice's conclusion that Father committed, or allowed to be committed, cruel and abusive conduct. View "In re Jazlyn P." on Justia Law

The state Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of respondents Kathleen D. and Ronald D. with respect to their two children, Steven and Zachary, after the children were removed from the parents because Kathleen was in a medically induced coma and Ronald could not care for the children alone due to epilepsy and rheumatoid arthritis. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate respondents' parental rights, finding that DCYF had shown that (1) the children would not be able to return safely to respondents' care within a reasonable period of time, (2) DCYF had made all reasonable efforts to reunite the children with respondents, and (3) it was in the best interests of the children that respondents' parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court vacated the decree of the family court, holding (1) the trial justice clearly erred in finding the DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Kathleen with her children, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that Ronald's health conditions would meet requirements for a finding of parental unfitness or that services had been offered or received by Ronald to address this problem. View "In re Steven D. " on Justia Law

In 2007, a family court justice terminated a mother's rights to her two children. The mother appealed, arguing (1) the trial justice erred in finding that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) proved by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to cooperate with services, that she was an unfit parent, and that it was in the children's best interests that mother's parental rights be terminated; and (2) the trial justice erred in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she concluded that the mother's successful completion of a drug-treatment program twenty months after her children were removed from her care was insufficient to rebut a presumption of chronic substance abuse; and (2) because the trial justice terminated the mother's parental rights on the ground of chronic substance abuse, any of DCYF's shortcomings with respect to other problems were only relevant if they contributed to the mother's inability to overcome her difficulties with substance abuse. The Court concluded that because the record gave no indication that the mother was incapable of succeeding with substance-abuse treatment the trial justice did not clearly err. View "In re Destiney L., et al." on Justia Law