Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife filed for a divorce from Husband. Thereafter, Husband unsuccessfully filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the family court did not have jurisdiction because Wife had not been a resident of the State for one year prior to the filing of the complaint. In the meantime, Wife filed an emergency motion for seeking an order restraining Husband from proceeding with a divorce action in any other jurisdiction, which the trial justice granted. After a trial, the trial justice sanctioned Husband for violation of a discovery order, distributed the martial property, found Wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony, ordered that Husband should pay Wife counsel fees, and found that Husband was in contempt of court because he violated the prior order restraining him from proceeding with a divorce in another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in denying Husband's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Wife residency in the State met the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the pertinent statute; (2) in awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony; (3) with respect to the award of counsel fees; and (4) in his adjudication of Husband as being in contempt of court. View "Meyer v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Wife filed a complaint for an absolute divorce, and Husband filed a counterclaim. As grounds for divorce, both parties cited irreconcilable differences. The proceedings in the family court spanned almost five years. The family court eventually granted Wife's complaint. At issue on appeal was the court's distribution of the stock of Microfibres, Inc. (Microfibres), of which Husband was the president and CEO, and Microfibres Partnership Limited (MPL). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the family court's decision addressing the portion of MPL that was marital property and the trial justice's grant of partial summary judgment holding that the stock of Microfibres was marital property; and (2) vacated the portion of the decision addressing the equitable distribution of the marital estate, holding that the trial justice erred when he declined to value his assignments of Microfibres and MPL. Remanded with direction to value Microfibres and MPL as of the date of trial and to distribute the marital estate in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16.1. View "McCulloch v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

After Evelyn was born, Father and Mother tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and marijuana. Eventually, the family court found both parents were unfit due to chronic drug use and terminated the parental rights of Father to Evelyn. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ample evidence supported the trial justice's finding that Father had a chronic substance abuse problem that rendered him unable to care for Evelyn; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that it was unlikely Evelyn could be returned to Father within a reasonable amount of time. View "In re Evelyn C." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed two petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother's and Father's (collectively, Respondents) parental rights with respect to their two children. The family court terminated Respondents' parental rights to their children, concluding (1) Mother was unfit because she had a chronic substance-abuse problem, her conduct was seriously detrimental to the children, and the children would not be able to safety return to her care within a reasonable period of time; and (2) Father was unfit because the children had been in state custody for more than twelve months without a substantial probability of safe return to his care and because he had abandoned the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its determinations. View "In re Isabella M. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the mother of two boys. After it was established that the boys were Defendant's children, Defendant moved for visitation, which the family court granted. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree child abuse, and the family court awarded sole custody to Plaintiff. Defendant was convicted of second-degree child abuse, but the charges were dismissed on appeal. Thereafter, Defendant unsuccessfully filed a motion for sole custody, arguing that the vacating of his conviction and the dismissal of the second-degree child abuse charge were changed circumstances sufficient to modify the existing custody decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of Defendant's failure to complete required domestic-violence counseling and drug testing, the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to modify custody. View "Catley v. Sampson" on Justia Law

After a trial, the family court terminated the parental rights of Respondent to her three children. The court found that Respondent was unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to her children in that she allowed conduct to be committed towards her children of a cruel and abusive nature, and she subjected her children to aggravated circumstances of sexual abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court, holding (1) even if the trial justice erred in permitting witnesses to testify about hearsay statements made by the children, the error was harmless because clear and convincing evidence supported the trial justice's findings; and (2) the trial justice did not err in failing to address whether the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had met its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between Respondent and her children before DCYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights, as DCYF was under no obligation to attempt reunification of the family. View "In re Rita F." on Justia Law

In 2000, Lauren unsuccessfully petitioned for guardianship of her father, Glenn. Appellants, including Lauren, subsequently removed Glenn from his house and refused to disclose his location. On June 26, 2003, the probate court awarded temporary limited co-guardianship to Glenn's business partner, David, and to Glenn's son, Dan. Because Appellant's refused to disclose Glenn's whereabouts, the court later ordered Appellants to retrieve Glenn and bring him before the court. In 2005, the probate court adjudged Appellants to be in contempt of the court's July 26, 2003 order. The court then appointed David as permanent guardian for Glenn. Glenn died in 2007. In 2010, the probate court assessed compensatory and contempt sanctions against Appellants totaling $447,000 in the aggregate. In 2011, the trial justice dismissed Appellants' appeals for failure to timely provide the probate record. Later that year, the superior court issued an execution on the probate court order awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' appeals, as the Court could not conduct any meaningful review due to the lack of a record before it. View "Griggs v. Heal" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a divorce decree, Plaintiff was awarded sole custody of her and Defendant's daughter, as well as all personal property in her possession, with a few exceptions, including a pair of diamond earrings. Later, Plaintiff filed a motion for the return of missing property and a federal question motion alleging a constitutional valuation due to a court clerk's failure to docket his earlier motion for an evaluation of his daughter. At a hearing, Plaintiff turned over the diamond earrings that were purportedly awarded to Defendant in the divorce decree, and the hearing justice then dismissed the two motions. Defendant subsequently asserted that Plaintiff had given him the wrong earrings. A hearing justice approved the proposed order dismissing Defendant's motion for return of missing property with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court, holding (1) the hearing justice properly denied Defendant's federal question motion, as Defendant did not appeal the entry of final judgment in his divorce and, thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear custody and visitation issues in this case; and (2) the hearing justice did not err in dismissing Defendant's motion for the return of personal property with prejudice. View "Richards v. Fiore" on Justia Law

The family court terminated the parental rights of Father and Mother (collectively, Respondents) to their daughter, Amiah P., after finding that both parents presented troubling histories involving imprisonment and drugs, that both parents had been incarcerated and Father was currently incarcerated, and that Amiah had been in foster care for nearly two years and had bonded with her foster family. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court's decree, holding that there was ample evidence to support the trial justice's finding that the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were unfit parents and that the termination of their parental rights was in Amiah's best interests. View "In re Amiah P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sofya Zharkopva appealed a family court judgment that dismissed her complaint against Defendant Paul Gaudreau. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged she and Defendant were in a common-law marriage. At trial, after hearing testimony from the parties and from several other witnesses, the trial justice found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a common-law marriage by clear and convincing evidence; accordingly, he dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial justice's decision failed to do "substantial justice" between the parties and that the trial justice overlooked and/or misconceived relevant and material evidence or was otherwise "clearly wrong." After review of the family court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not misconceive or overlook relevant evidence, nor was he clearly wrong when he found that Plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a common-law marriage existed between herself and the defendant. View "Zharkova v. Gaudreau" on Justia Law