Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Newport School Committee and the Cumberland School Committee (collectively, plaintiffs) and the Rhode Island Department of Education and the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education (collectively, defendants). The dispute arose when the plaintiffs refused to reimburse the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) at the "per-pupil special-education" rate for the cost of educating children who were placed in residential treatment programs by DCYF but were not receiving special-education services. The Family Court had placed two children in the temporary custody of DCYF and designated Newport and Cumberland as the residences of the children's custodial parents for the purpose of determining the municipalities' financial responsibility for the children's education.The Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education agreed with DCYF's argument that the municipalities were required to pay the per-pupil special-education rate according to the unambiguous language of the relevant statutes. The Commissioner issued two decisions ordering Newport and Cumberland to reimburse DCYF for the cost of educational services provided to the children at the special-education rate. After the Council on Elementary and Secondary Education denied the municipalities' independent appeals of the Commissioner's decisions, the municipalities appealed to the Superior Court. The trial justice consolidated the two cases and issued a written decision, determining that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute required the designated city or town to pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF rather than the higher, per-pupil special-education rate.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and found that there is nothing in the relevant statutes that expressly obligates a municipality to pay the per-pupil special-education rate when the child in question is not actually receiving special-education services. The court concluded that municipalities are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil special-education rate when there were no special education services rendered and thus, no special education costs incurred. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to resolve the remaining question of what reimbursement, if any, DCYF should receive for the educational cost of non-special-education students placed in residential treatment programs that include the delivery of educational services. View "Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees and the University of Rhode Island (plaintiffs) and the Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter (defendant). The dispute arose from a breach-of-contract related to the construction of a Center for Hellenic Studies at the University of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs and defendant had entered into a Ground Lease Agreement that established the parameters for this construction project. The defendant failed to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the agreed timeframe, leading to litigation.The Superior Court stayed the litigation pending arbitration, as per the mandate. The arbitration proceedings were held, and the arbitrator issued a decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had breached the lease agreement by failing to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the requisite timeframe, among other failures. The arbitrator also determined that a joint venture did not exist between the parties. The arbitrator directed the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost and expenses that they will incur in their efforts to restore the construction site to its prior status.The plaintiffs filed a motion in Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award, which the defendant objected to and cross-moved to vacate. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award and denied the defendant's cross-motion to vacate. The trial justice declined to review the arbitrator’s determination that the plaintiffs properly terminated the lease agreement and rejected the defendant’s objection to the arbitral remedy.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' lease agreement and lacked any indication that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court affirmed the trial justice's order confirming the arbitration award. View "The University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees v. Hellenic Society Paideia-Rhode Island Chapter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jessica Marie Purcell's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that Clay Johnson be removed from the Chariho Regional School Committee and ordering the Town Council of the Town of Richmond to appoint Purcell to the School Committee and denied Johnson's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that he rightfully retain his membership on the School Committee, holding that Purcell was entitled to relief.On January 19, 2023, the Town Council voted to appoint Johnson to the town's vacant seat on the School Committee to serve the remainder of Gary Ligouri's term following his resignation. Purcell brought this action seeking an order removing Johnson from the Committee and requiring the Council to appoint Purcell, as prescribed by the Town's Home Rule Charter. In response, the Town and Johnson filed an emergency quo warranto petition claiming right and title to the public office pursuant to the Chariho Act. See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 286. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed Johnson's petition and granted Purcell's petition, holding that Purcell was legally entitled to the office of Chariho Regional School Committee member. View "Purcell v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial and from the judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in this case arising from an assault by one student on another in a high school's hallway, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs, the assaulted student and his parents, filed an amended complaint alleging that Foster-Glocester Regional School District owed a duty to the student to provide him with a safe learning environment and that the school district failed to do so. A jury found that the school district was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of all three of Plaintiffs' injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court will not disturb the trial justice's decisions denying the school district's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. View "Dextraze v. Bernard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory relief asserting that he had a right to access to records in the possession of the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE) pursuant to the Access to Public Records Act (APRA). The motion justice found that the requested documents were not public records subject to disclosure under APRA. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the records requested by Plaintiff were not public records for the purposes of APRA, and therefore, the motion justice properly disposed of Plaintiff’s complaint on RIDE’s motion to dismiss. View "Pontarelli v. R.I. Department of Elementary & Secondary Education" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the correct statutory interpretation of the manner in which state education aid funds received by the Bristol Warren Regional School District (the district) should be calculated and apportioned to the towns of Bristol and Warren. The superior court granted Warren’s petition for writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and a complaint for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err when it failed to bar Warren’s claims pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata; (2) did not err by declining to dismiss the action because other school districts had not been joined; (3) did not err when it did not give full deference to the Rhode Island Department of Education’s interpretation of the statutory framework concerning the proper manner of calculating and allocating state aid to regional school districts; and (4) did not misinterpret the governing statutory scheme or ignore the statutory definition of “community” as it applies to funding the district. View "Town of Warren v. Bristol Warren Regional School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney employed as a hearing officer for the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE), filed a complaint alleging that RIDE and the Rhode Island Board Counsel on Elementary and Secondary Education (collectively, Defendants) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by failing to provide adequate notice of a September 2014 council meeting and by failing to provide any notice of meetings held by the Compensation Review Committee (CRC). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendants violated the OMA by failing to provide adequate notice of the September 2014 meeting; and (2) the CRC is not a public body and, therefore, is not subject to the OMA. View "Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully seeking reimbursement from the State Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, Plaintiffs, a school district and school department, filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the Commissioner and State Treasurer were required to reimburse them for the salary, fringe benefits, and travel expenses of the directors and guidance counselors in their vocational-technical programs. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and that the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiffs reimbursement was discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial. Plaintiffs subsequently sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a clear legal right to be reimbursed for certain costs associated with the operation of their career and technical centers. View "Chariho Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Gist" on Justia Law

David Alba was appointed to serve as principal of an elementary school in Cranston, Rhode Island. Alba and the Cranston School Committee subsequently entered into an employment contract. Later, after a hearing, the Committee rejected a recommendation to renew Alba’s employment contract. Alba appealed the Committee’s decision. The Commissioner of Education denied and dismissed Alba’s appeal, concluding that Alba had received all the process to which he was entitled under the contract and the School Administrators’ Rights Act. The Board of Regents affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee acted within its authority when it voted against the recommendation to renew Alba’s contract; and (2) the Committee’s nonrenewal of Alba’s contract did not deprive Alba of his rights under the Administrators’ Rights Act. View "Alba v. Cranston Sch. Comm." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school committees of Woonsocket and Pawtucket and unnamed students, parents, and the superintendents from both districts, brought suit against the legislative and executive branches of Rhode Island’s state government challenging the state’s school funding formula. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Education Clause as well as violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights because the formula failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities. The superior court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prior case law as well as the separation of powers doctrine warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Education Clause claim; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to establish potential substantive due process claims. View "Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee " on Justia Law