Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, defendant was charged with simple assault, G.L. 1956 11-5-3. On February 15, 2013, a separate criminal information was filed charging defendant with “break[ing] and enter[ing] the dwelling of [defendant’s sister] without the consent of the owner,” G.L. 1956 11-8-2 and 12-29-5. Both charges were tried on a jury-waived basis. Defendant moved to dismiss the breaking and entering charge “based on the fact that [the state had] not presented evidence to establish the crime of breaking and entering.” Defense counsel stated: “I’m suggesting .. that you apply the statutory language for ... willful trespass ...my client is most likely guilty of.” The trial justice found her guilty of simple assault; with respect to breaking and entering, he concluded that it had been established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the misdemeanor offense of willful trespass. The justice sentenced her to a one-year suspended sentence with one year of probation on each count, to run consecutively. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that, concerning the simple assault, defendant’s speedy trial right was violated; that willful trespass is not a lesser-included offense of breaking and entering; and that the trial justice erred in denying her motion to dismiss the breaking and entering charge. View "State v. Connery" on Justia Law

In February 2008, defendant received a seven-year suspended sentence with probation, after he had pled nolo contendere to one count of breaking and entering a dwelling. In June 2012, after defendant was found to be in violation of his probation, he was sentenced to serve six months, leaving 78 months of his suspended sentence remaining. The defendant was still on probation in March 2014, when the state filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation by “fail[ing] to keep the peace and be of good behavior” in connection with a domestic disturbance involving his pregnant girlfriend. The court ordered him to serve 72 of the 78 months remaining on the suspended sentence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and that the penalty was “excessive.” The lower court adequately considered the “hiatus” in defendant’s criminal conduct. View "State v. Fairweather" on Justia Law

Benoit was working as part of a crew replacing windows at an apartment complex, when a resident found him rifling through a wallet that was on the top of a dresser in the resident’s bedroom. Benoit was convicted of entering an apartment with the intent to commit larceny and received a four-year sentence, with 18 months to serve and 30 months suspended, with 30 months of probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to commit larceny at the time he entered the apartment and that the jury heard an officer testify that he responded to a call for a “[p]ossible burglary in progress,” the prejudicial effect of which was so severe that a mistrial was warranted. View "State v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Early in the morning of October 25, 2011, as she was leaving for work, Lora, was viciously attacked by a masked assailant in the front hall of her home and was severely cut on her face with a small blade. Lora subsequently identified her attacker as Breton, with whom she had previously had a two-year-long romantic relationship. Breton was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and simple assault on Lora. A third count was for a simple assault against Lora’s daughter, which was alleged to have occurred on May 26, 2010. When the case was reached for trial, Breton was convicted of the two counts of assault against Lora, but acquitted of the third count. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial justice misconstrued the evidence when he found Lora to be a more credible witness than the alibi witnesses produced by Breton, Breton’s mother and a family friend. View "State v. Breton" on Justia Law

Florez was convicted of one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (sexual contact with a person 14 years of age or under) in violation of G.L. 1956 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4 and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, with eight years to serve and the remaining time suspended with probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial; that the trial justice’s jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed in that they permitted the jury to return a non-unanimous guilty verdict; that the trial justice erred by allowing the state to improperly refresh the complainant’s recollection; and that the trial justice committed reversible error by declining to admit parts of the witness statement of the complainant’s father into evidence. View "State v. Florez" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Cranston Police Department filed delinquency petitions alleging that, when B.H. was 13 years old, he committed two offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of first-degree child molestation and one offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of second-degree child molestation. The victims were 11-year-old boys.The Family Court found the B.H. delinquent for the violations under G.L. 1956 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded, finding that the evidence at the delinquency proceeding was insufficient to establish sexual penetration—an element of both of the charges of first-degree child molestation of which the respondent was adjudged to be delinquent. The court directed the Family Court to enter adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (second-degree child molestation). View "In the Matter of B.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of possession of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress physical evidence seized and statements made to the police, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause and that the subsequent search of his jacket was unconstitutional. The trial justice denied the motion, determining that police had probable cause to arrest Defendant. After a trial, the jury convicted Defendant of the charged offense. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that Defendant’s arrest was not supported by probable cause, and therefore, his motion to suppress should have been granted. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

In 2010, the General Assembly amended R.I. Gen. Laws 12-19-18 to provide that a sentence of imprisonment after a finding of probation violation shall be quashed and the imprisonment terminated in certain circumstances occurring after a judgment of probation violation. In 2009, Defendant pled nolo contendere to felony assault. In 2012, while on probation, Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual assault and robbery. The State filed a notice of probation violation based on the conduct giving rise to these charges. The trial justice declared Defendant to be a probation violator and ordered him to serve two years of his suspended sentence. Thereafter, Defendant was acquitted on both counts. Defendant filed a motion to terminate his imprisonment. The trial justice denied Defendant’s motion, concluding (1) application of section 12-19-18(b) required impermissible retroactive application of the 2010 amendment; and (2) even if applied prospectively, section 12-19-18(b) constituted an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power by the General Assembly. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) this case entails prospective, not retroactive, application of the statute; and (2) the trial justice was without authority to decide, sua sponte, a constitutional issue that was not raised by the parties. View "State v. Beaudoin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of felony assault. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and the balance suspended with probation. In 2012, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging that Defendant failed to comply with the condition of his probation that he keep the peace and be of good behavior. After a violation hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and ordered Defendant to serve two years of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in finding that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation on the basis of the evidence presented by the State. View "State v. Beaudoin" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with eight counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made after his arrest and during his interrogations at the police department, claiming that the statements were coerced and not made voluntarily. The trial justice denied Defendant’s motion to suppress after a hearing. After a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on two of the eight counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police during his post-arrest interrogation. The Supreme Court remanded to the superior court for additional fact-finding and credibility determinations. On remand and after a hearing, the trial justice denied Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not the product of coercion or impermissible conduct on the part of the interrogating detectives. View "State v. Bojang" on Justia Law