Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In case concerning a lease dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff was not in privity of contract, either through a lease agreement or an attainment agreement, and could not challenge the validity of the original lease or any of its amendments. Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Defendants. The superior court granted Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the declarations sought. On the eve of trial, the superior court granted full summary judgment for Defendants and entered final judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff was not in privity of contract with Defendants and lacked standing to assert the allegations raised in its complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "1112 Charles, L.P. v. Fornel Entertainment, Inc." on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was an allegedly underfunded trust that was created by the decedent, Donelson Glassie (Donelson), for the benefit of his daughter, the late Jacquelin Glassie (Jacquelin), in accordance with a property settlement agreement between Jacquelin’s divorcing parents, Donelson and Marcia Glassie. After Donelson died, Jacquelin filed a claim against his estate, alleging that her father breached the property settlement agreement by failing to properly fund the trust. The claim was denied. Jacquelin then filed this action alleging breach of contract in that Donelson failed to carry out the provisions of the property settlement agreement. Jacquelin then died. Alison Glassie was appointed executrix of Jacqulin’s estate and was substituted as plaintiff in this action. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the executor of Donelson’s estate, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the estate because, generally, only a trustee may institute an action on behalf of the beneficiaries of a trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff lacked the requisite standing to sue her father’s estate for benefits she would have received based on her status as the beneficiary of the trust. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

Lend Lease (US) Construction was the general contractor on a project, and Rossi Electric Company, Inc. was a subcontractor. An employee of Rossi’s subcontractor was injured while working on the project and filed a negligence claim against Lend Lease. Lend Lease filed a third-party complaint against Rossi, alleging that, under the terms of a contract between the parties, Rossi was required to defend and indemnify Lend Lease. The superior court entered an order granting summary judgment for Rossi. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that issues of material fact remained to be determined, and therefore, this case was not ripe for summary judgment. Remanded. View "Walsh v. Lend Lease (US) Construction" on Justia Law

In 2012, Nappa Construction Management, LLC (Nappa) and Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the Flynns) entered into a contract for a commercial construction project. Service Insurance Company, Inc. (Service Insurance) furnished a performance bond on the contract. In 2013, the Flynns directed Nappa to stop work on the project. Nappa subsequently submitted an application for payment, which the Flynns declined to pay. Nappa then terminated the contract due to nonpayment. The Flynns filed an action alleging that Nappa had wrongfully terminated the contract. Nappa filed a demand for arbitration in accordance with an arbitration provision in the contract and also named Service Insurance as a party to the arbitration. The arbitrator found that Nappa was not justified in terminating the contract but concluded that, under the termination-for-convenience clause in the contract, neither Nappa nor the Flynns were in breach of the contract. The arbitrator awarded Nappa $37,980. The superior court granted Nappa’s petition to confirm the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in holding that the contract was terminated for convenience. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in interpreting the contract. View "Nappa Construction Management, LLC v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Cardi Corporation contracted with the State to construct a portion of a highway construction project dealing with Interstate 195 in Rhode Island (I-Way Project). Cardi subcontracted with High Steel to supply steel for the project. Asserting that it was never paid for 182,873 pounds of temporary steel bracing, High Steel brought suit against Cardi. In response, Cardi filed a third-party action for breach of contract against the State. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on the third-party suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract was clear and unambiguous and did not require payment for temporary bracing steel. View "High Steel Structures, Inc. v. Cardi Corp. v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the construction of a backyard patio at Defendant’s property. Defendants, the property owners, hired a general contractor, who contracted with Plaintiff for masonry work. Plaintiff filed suit, asserting that Defendants owed it money beyond that paid to it by the general contractor. At issue during the bench trial was whether Plaintiff was paid to construct Defendants’ backyard patio. The trial justice ultimately entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in his factual determinations and credibility assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice neither overlooked nor misconceived material evidence. View "A. Salvati Masonry Inc. v. Andreozzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Rose and RC&D, Inc. filed suit against Defendants Stephen Brusini and the law firm Orson & Brusini Ltd. alleging professional negligence and breach of contract. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that there was no evidence of proximate cause linking Defendants’ alleged negligence and any damages Plaintiffs may have suffered. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Rose submitted sufficient competent evidence to preclude the entry of summary judgment for defendants on a question of fact relating to Defendants’ liability. Remanded. View "Rose v. Brusini" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, was a resident of Rhode Island at the time of the contract in dispute. Defendant was a resident of New York. Plaintiff entered into a contract in New York regarding Plaintiff’s employment to serve as captain of Defendant’s sailboat. After Plaintiff was terminated, Plaintiff filed suit in a Rhode Island court, alleging breach of contract. Defendant answered, averring that Rhode Island did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The case proceeded to trial, and the trial justice concluded that Rhode Island could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Defendant forfeited his jurisdictional defense of lack of personal jurisdiction through unjustified delay and active participation in litigation proceedings. View "Pullar v. Cappelli" on Justia Law

In 1996, Matthew Cote accepted an employment opportunity with Richmond Ready-Mix (RRM) when John Aiello explained that Plaintiff could purchase RRM in the future. Over the years, Aiello repeatedly assured Cote that he would purchase RRM. In 2005, Aiello sold RRM to Peter Calcagni. Cote subsequently filed an action against the John and Anna-Maria Aiello (together, the Aiellos) alleging breach of an implied contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial justice found for the Aiellos on all claims, concluding that Cote failed to prove the existence of an implied contract to purchase RRM and that Aiello’s promises to Plaintiff did not support a claim for promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in dismissing the complaint. View "Cote v. Aiello" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an application with the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) seeking to expand his condominium unit. Defendants filed an objection to the proposal, asserting that Plaintiff did not own the property upon which he sought to expand his unit. CRMC denied the application. Plaintiff subsequently brought a complaint alleging slander of title and breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that he had the right to file his application with the CRMC. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Rhode Island’s anti-SLAPP statute protected them from liability for questioning Plaintiff’s ownership of the land in their communications with the CRMC. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants then filed a motion seeking attorney fees incurred in defending the anti-SLAPP judgment on appeal. The hearing justice awarded Defendants $8,924 in attorney’s fees in connection with the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding (1) the issue of attorney’s fees was properly before the superior court; and (2) the superior court did not abuse his discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. View "Sisto v. America Condo. Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law