Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case. View "Iozzi v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law

The facts of this case were "clear and undisputed; in point of fact, they are a textbook example of a mechanic's-lien dispute." Plaintiff, GSM Industrial, Inc., was a subcontractor that entered into an agreement with AirPol, Inc., a general contractor, to install an air-pollution-control mechanism on property owned by Defendant Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, Inc. When AirPol failed to pay GSM the balance of its fee, GSM filed a complaint to enforce a mechanic's lien against Grinnell. The particular issue before the Supreme Court was whether a notarial acknowledgment in a subcontractor's notice of intention satisfied the statutory requirement that such a statement be "under oath." A justice of the Superior Court ruled that a Pennsylvania notary public's "acknowledgement" was insufficient to satisfy the oath requirement, and, as a result, the notice was fatally defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "GSM Industrial, Inc. v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award. View "Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee" on Justia Law

The dispute at the center of this case arose from a business relationship that "rapidly turned sour." Plaintiffs Charles and Marguerite Takian and Defendants Ralph and Lucia Rafaelian together purchased property in South Kingstown that included a motel, restaurant and trailer park. The couples formed a business to manage the property and Plaintiffs agreed to run the businesses. In 2002, the relationship between the parties deteriorated when Defendants alleged Plaintiffs were mismanaging the businesses. Defendants decided to sell their interest to Plaintiffs' son Randolph. As part of the sale, Defendants signed a release absolving Plaintiffs from "any and all claims arising out of the ownership of the property and operation of the business." After the sale, Defendants continued to feel "unsettled" about how the business had been operated. They investigated further and alleged to have discovered facts that suggested far more serious misdeeds in management. Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory relief, in which they sought a ruling that the release that had been executed by Defendants contemporaneous with the sale barred any further claims. Defendants counterclaimed, both on behalf of themselves and derivatively on behalf of the corporation, alleging embezzlement, misrepresentation, misappropriation, and loss of corporate opportunity. A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, after he found that the release was both valid and effective against both defendants and the corporation. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found triable issues of fact that were inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to those remaining issues. View "Takian v. Rafaelian" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael A. Langlois appealed a Superior Court's declaratory judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association. The judgment decreed that a lease agreement that Defendant had entered into violated the "Declaration of Condominium of Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominiums." Defendant asserted on appeal that the declaration was ambiguous and that, therefore, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted it to exclude the lease agreement. Upon review of the lease agreement in question, the Supreme Court concluded the trial justice did not incorrectly interpret the language, and affirmed that court's decision. View "Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the decedent Robert Daniel George, who was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist in 2006, qualified as an insured under an insurance policy provided by Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company, which policy was procured by The Cormack-Routhier Agency, Inc. Plaintiffs Pamela A. Riel and Glenn N. George, as co-administrators of the decedent’s estate, and Pamela A. Riel, on behalf of her and the decedent’s minor daughter, Kara George, brought a complaint against Defendants Harleysville and Cormack for declaratory and other relief, but a Superior Court justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Harleysville because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the decedent should be considered a named insured under the policy. Plaintiffs further asserted that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Cormack because, even if they failed to establish that the decedent was a named insured, they still were entitled to pursue their claims against Cormack for failing to procure adequate coverage. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Riel v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the applicability of an assault and/or battery exclusion in a commercial general liability insurance policy. Great American E&S Insurance Company filed a declaratory-judgment action against its insured, End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. and Defendant Michael Gondusky. Gondusky previously had filed a civil suit against End Zone alleging that he had been seriously injured by two doormen who were employed by End Zone. The Superior Court entered both an order granting Great American's motion for summary judgment and a declaratory judgment decreeing that Great American "owe[d] no duty to defend or obligation to indemnify relative to the underlying action brought by Michael Gondusky against End Zone * * *." Gondusky appealed the Superior Court’s judgment. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court concluded that cause had not been shown and that this case could be decided without further briefing or argument. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Great American E&S Ins. Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife who were both injured by an uninsured motorist while riding their motorcycle. The husband, Leo Fontaine, died as a result of his injuries. The motorcycle in question was not expressly identified in the policy at issue. Plaintiff-Insurer New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC) filed suit for declaratory relief seeking clarification of the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to their policy issued to the couple. Arguing that the policy language unambiguously excluded the defendants' claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court. Defendants Karolyn Fontaine, individually and on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the policy language explicitly excluded Defendants' claims from coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence. View "Hazard v. Hazard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. Zebra Technologies later acquired Atlantek. Three years later, Plaintiff was laid off. Plaintiff signed a release document and submitted it to Zebra Atlantek without consulting with his attorney. According to another document received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's receipt of separation benefits was contingent on the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document wherein Plaintiff released any claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or any state law prohibiting employment discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff later commenced an action against Defendants, Zebra Atlantek and several individuals, alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the FEPA and State Civil Rights Act. Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit constituted a material breach of the release document. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that FEPA did not render the release document void as it applied to Plaintiff's pending FEPA claims. View "Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc." on Justia Law