Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a member of a union, filed a complaint against Defendant, her former employer, alleging that during her employment she was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of her race and color and that she was wrongfully terminated. Defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings, arguing that the proper forum for resolution of Plaintiff’s claims was binding arbitration as required by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Defendant. A hearing justice granted Defendant’s motion to stay and ordered that the matter be resolved through arbitration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the hearing justice’s decision was in error because the CBA’s arbitration provision did not preclude her from asserting her statutorily created rights under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) in a judicial forum. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding that the CBA’s general arbitration provision, which contained no specific reference to the state anti-discrimination statutes at issue, did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of Plaintiff’s right to a judicial forum in which to litigate her claims arising under the RICRA and the FEPA. Remanded.View "Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree sexual assault. A jury trial commenced, but the trial justice granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial due to a discovery violation. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss the sexual-assault charge on double jeopardy grounds because of prosecutorial goading. The trial justice denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, holding that sufficient evidence in the record supported the trial justice’s finding that the objective facts did not give rise to an inference of intentional goading.View " State v. Rolle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial justice erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements made to police during a post-arrest interrogation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial and discerned no error arising from the justice’s evidentiary rulings; but (2) remanded the case to the superior court with directions to make additional findings of fact and credibility determinations concerning the voluntariness of Defendant’s confessions, as the trial justice failed to make the findings of fact and credibility determinations essential to support his ultimate finding of voluntariness. View "State v. Bojang" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of two witnesses during her closing argument. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by allowing the state to impeach Defendant’s credibility with his fourteen prior criminal convictions; and (2) although a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument was akin to vouching, the trial justice did not err by refusing to pass the case. View "State v. Whitfield" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment of conviction and its denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to pass the case after the prosecutor engaged in an improper line of questioning to a witness, as any prejudice which may have resulted was cured by the trial justice’s instruction to the jury; and (2) the trial justice did not misconceive or overlook material testimony and did not otherwise commit clear error in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Hie" on Justia Law

In 1990, Applicant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault. In 2001, Applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and trial error. In 2005, the hearing justice denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly did not commit clear error or misconceive material evidence in rendering his decision, as (1) Applicant’s claims relating to alleged errors committed by the trial justice were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Applicant failed to show to his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Lamoureux v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree child molestation. Before he was sentenced, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The trial justice denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to three concurrent sentences of fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions. Eighteen months after sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence, arguing that his plea to the criminal charges should be set aside because his attorney did not inform him that the attorney was undergoing personal struggles during his representation of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's appeal was not properly before the court; and (2) even if Defendant's argument was properly made, the argument was without merit.View "State v. Castriotta" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The trial justice denied the application, concluding that Appellant failed to establish that his counsel’s performance was deficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that trial counsel performed at a high level and in thus denying Appellant’s application for postconviction relief. View "Merida v. State" on Justia Law

In 1998, Applicant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Applicant later filed an application for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In connection with his application, Applicant filed a subpoena duces tecum seeking discovery of the mental health records of Appellant, who testified as an eyewitness in Applicant's murder trial. Appellant filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded with directions to make further factual findings, holding that the trial justice erred in ordering the release of Appellant's health care records without first conducting the necessary statutory analysis.View "DePina v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license and possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because the the State produced sufficient evidence at trial from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed the handgun; and (2) the trial justice did not violate Defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel by restricting defense counsel’s closing argument. View "State v. Ferrer" on Justia Law