Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that she was shopping at a Walgreens store when she was hit and injured by a ball that an employee of Walgreens had thrown. The trial justice eventually dismissed the case with prejudice “for failure to proceed at trial” after first denying Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that, in light of the unusual circumstances of this case, the trial justice abused her discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of prosecution and in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance and/or mistrial. View "Cotter v. Dias" on Justia Law

In Huntley I, the Supreme Court determined that a judgment entered in the federal district court for the defendants, including the State and the Office of the Attorney General, against Plaintiff Dawn Huntley was entitled to preclusive effect. Undaunted by the opinion in Huntley I, Plaintiff argued that her state court action was still viable because individual defendants Mr. Goulart, Mr. Coyne, and Mr. Lynch, had not pled or otherwise defended the civil action. Plaintiff and her attorney (together, Appellants) obtained default judgment against Mr. Goulart and filed similar applications for entry of default against Mr. Coyne and Mr. Lynch. A justice of the superior court vacated the default entered against Mr. Goulart and sustained Mr. Coyne’s and Mr. Lynch’s objections to the pending applications for entry of default against them. The hearing justice then sanctioned Appellants, ruling that the applications for default had not been filed in good faith. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Huntley I was clearly applicable to the individual defendants and Appellants had not standing to challenge the individual defendants’ representation by the Office of the Attorney General; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the hearing justice’s sanction. View "Huntley v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument. View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and other defendants, alleging multiple counts. A jury found Defendants liable for abuse of process and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant. On May 31, 2012, judgments were entered against Defendants. On August 31, 2012, Metropolitan filed an appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment, and on September 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment. Metropolitan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, arguing that it was untimely because it was not filed within the initial twenty-day appeal period that began to run after entry of the August 20, 2012 orders. The trial justice denied Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within twenty days of Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s September 18, 2012 notice of cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within the twenty-day period triggered by Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. View "Miller v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law