Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On August 12, 2014, Eva Pena was injured while attempting to board a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) bus in Providence. She alleged that the bus driver closed the doors on her, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. After her death in 2019, her estate continued the suit, claiming negligence by RIPTA. At trial, testimony was presented from multiple witnesses, including Pena’s deposition, the bus driver, a RIPTA supervisor, and Pena’s son. Central to the dispute was the supervisor’s account of a conversation with Pena, which had been facilitated by an unidentified Spanish interpreter at the scene.The Providence County Superior Court admitted the supervisor’s testimony and report about what Pena allegedly said through the interpreter, overruling objections that this constituted inadmissible hearsay. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA, finding that the plaintiff had not proven negligence. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice erred in allowing hearsay testimony via the unidentified interpreter. The trial court denied the motion, finding the issue unsettled under Rhode Island law and suitable for appellate clarification.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s denial of a new trial. The Supreme Court held that admitting the supervisor’s testimony and report regarding Pena’s statements, relayed through the unidentified interpreter, was an abuse of discretion because it constituted inadmissible hearsay lacking reliability and trustworthiness. The Court found that this evidence was not cumulative and its admission affected the substantial rights of the parties. The case was remanded for a new trial consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Fernandez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees.The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

In March 2010, a motor vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 95 South in Cranston, Rhode Island, involving Julie DeOliveira, her daughter Maxine, and a truck driven by Greg Trecaso, who was insured by Star Insurance Company. Julie and Maxine claimed that Mr. Trecaso negligently operated his truck, causing their injuries. After Mr. Trecaso and his business were dismissed from the case due to lack of service, Star Insurance remained as defendant. The case proceeded to a jury trial where the key dispute was whether Mr. Trecaso’s actions caused the accident, as described by conflicting accounts from Julie, Maxine, Mr. Trecaso (via deposition), and a police officer.The Providence County Superior Court admitted contested evidence, including Mr. Trecaso’s deposition and a police report, over plaintiffs’ objections. During trial, the jury heard testimony from the plaintiffs, Mr. Trecaso’s deposition, and Trooper Hanley, who investigated the accident. The jury found that neither Julie nor Maxine proved by a preponderance of evidence that Star Insurance’s insured was negligent. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied by the Superior Court, as was Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed several alleged errors, including evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, statements by defense counsel, and the verdict sheet. The Court applied an abuse of discretion standard to evidentiary and procedural rulings and found no error by the trial justice. The Court concluded that the jury instructions were proper, the verdict sheet was not misleading, and the empty chair doctrine was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and the judgment in favor of Star Insurance Company, declining to address the defendant’s cross-appeal. View "DeOliveira v. Trecaso" on Justia Law

A dispute arose following a failed real estate transaction involving the sale of a hotel property in Warwick, Rhode Island. The property was to be sold by Shiva, LLC, of which Jay Patel was the registered agent, to LandingPartners LLC under a Purchase and Sale and Discounted Pay-Off Agreement. Centreville Bank held a mortgage on the property, which was in default. When Shiva, Airport Hospitality (another entity linked to Patel), and Patel failed to respond to an earlier lawsuit brought by LandingPartners, the Superior Court entered a default judgment against them, ordering specific performance of their obligations under the agreement and appointing a commissioner to facilitate the closing. Afterward, LandingPartners and Centreville Bank reached a consent order with new terms for the sale and discharged the mortgage, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.Shortly after the dismissal of the first case, Patel filed a new lawsuit in the Washington County Superior Court against LandingPartners, Centreville, and a related entity, 1850 Post Road Owner LLC. He alleged violations of the agreement, fraud, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transaction addressed in the prior litigation. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the parties or their privies were the same, the issues arose from the same transaction, and there was a final judgment in the first action.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that res judicata barred Patel’s claims, as all issues now raised were or could have been raised in the initial suit, and the new claims concerned the same transaction. The dismissal of Patel’s complaint with prejudice was therefore upheld. View "Jay Patel v. LandingPartners LLC et al." on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment in the amount of $109,250 plus interest and costs against a defendant, the plaintiff sought to collect the judgment by garnishing the defendant’s wages from her employer, a corporation. The employer was served with a writ of attachment but failed to timely file legally valid affidavits regarding the defendant’s wages, as required by statute. The plaintiff then moved to hold the employer liable for the full amount of the judgment, arguing that the statutory requirements for affidavits had not been satisfied. During the course of proceedings, the defendant passed away, and the employer ultimately provided affidavits with valid notarization and tendered the garnished wages to the plaintiff.A justice of the Providence County Superior Court initially granted the plaintiff’s first motion to charge the employer the full amount of the judgment, but, after the employer moved to vacate, that order was set aside. The plaintiff filed a second motion to charge the employer, again asserting that the statutory requirements had not been met. At hearings on the second motion, the plaintiff conceded that the employer had not refused or neglected to supply the required account of wages. The hearing justice found that the employer had provided the necessary information and that the plaintiff had received all wages withheld before the defendant’s death, resulting in no injury to the plaintiff. The court denied the second motion to charge.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that, under the relevant statute, a garnishee can only be held liable for the full judgment if it “refuses or neglects” to provide the required sworn account. Because the plaintiff conceded there was no such refusal or neglect, and the plaintiff received all garnished wages, the statutory prerequisites for liability were not met. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to charge the employer. View "Strassman v. Howe" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations of breach of contract and related claims involving a credit card account that the defendant allegedly opened with a national bank. The bank claimed that the defendant opened the account, used it for purchases and cash advances, and then defaulted by failing to make the required payments, leaving a substantial unpaid balance. The defendant denied the material allegations in her answer to the complaint.After the initial pleadings, the bank moved for summary judgment in the Kent County Superior Court, asserting that there were no material facts in dispute and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Importantly, the bank’s motion was not initially accompanied by any supporting affidavits or exhibits. The defendant filed an affidavit in opposition, pointing out the lack of any supporting affidavit from the bank. On the day of the hearing, the bank submitted an affidavit by emailing it to the hearing justice’s clerk, rather than filing and serving it in accordance with procedural rules. Despite the defendant’s objections to this late submission and improper service, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, relying on the belated affidavit. Final judgment was entered, and the defendant appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court found that the bank’s failure to timely file and serve the affidavit, as required by Rule 6(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudiced the defendant’s ability to respond. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in relying on the untimely affidavit and in not postponing the hearing. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "American Express National Bank v. Perretta" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an individual residing overseas, alleged that his longstanding debit card account with the defendant bank was improperly deactivated on multiple occasions, including after a series of withdrawals he used to pay rent in Mauritius. He claimed that the bank’s customer service was difficult to navigate and that the deactivation caused him mental anguish and damages. He sought damages and injunctive relief, asserting the bank had a duty to restore his access and protect against fraud without jeopardizing customers.The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in the Kent County Superior Court. The plaintiff, who was self-represented, filed a motion seeking permission to appear remotely by WebEx for the hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Superior Court docket indicated that his motion to appear remotely was not scheduled because he did not request a hearing date. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, identifying the docket entry regarding his unscheduled motion as the order appealed from. After this, the Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the plaintiff’s appeal, which focused on the denial of his motion to appear remotely and broader challenges to the Superior Court’s in-person appearance requirements. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was procedurally improper because the plaintiff did not appeal from an appealable final judgment, order, or decree, but rather from a non-appealable docket entry. The Court therefore denied and dismissed the appeal, and the case may be remanded to the Superior Court. The Court also noted that the discretion to permit remote appearances lies with the trial justice under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. View "LaPadula v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff employed by the Rhode Island Department of Public Safety applied for both ordinary and accidental disability retirement pensions, claiming a back injury sustained in 2011 caused him to stop working in 2020. The Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island’s Disability Committee recommended approval of only the ordinary disability pension, finding the accidental disability claim untimely under the statutory filing limits, and noting no evidence of an intervening injury or aggravation. The state retirement board adopted this recommendation and denied the accidental disability pension. Despite submitting additional evidence and requesting rehearing and further medical evaluation, the deputy sheriff’s application continued to be denied by the board, which advised that any appeal could be made in the Superior Court or the Workers’ Compensation Court, if applicable.Following these denials, the deputy sheriff filed appeals in both the Superior Court and the Workers’ Compensation Court. The Employees’ Retirement System moved to dismiss the Workers’ Compensation Court matter, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over a state employee’s appeal. The trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court denied the motion, concluding that jurisdiction existed based on multiple statutes, including those relating to injured-on-duty payments and the right to appeal denials of accidental disability pensions.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on certiorari and held that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the deputy sheriff’s appeal. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme provides for Workers’ Compensation Court jurisdiction only for municipal employees covered under the Optional Retirement Plan, not for state employees like the petitioner, who are covered by the state retirement system. The Supreme Court therefore quashed the trial judge’s order and remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "O'Connell v. Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased undeveloped property in Westerly, Rhode Island, in 1999. In 2007, they applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for permission to install an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS), a prerequisite for building a residence on their land. DEM denied their application because the groundwater table on the property was only five inches below the surface, while regulations required a minimum of twelve inches. The plaintiffs did not pursue an administrative appeal at that time.In 2020, more than a decade after the denial, the plaintiffs filed suit in Washington County Superior Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for an alleged regulatory taking under state and federal law. They also asserted that the regulation violated their rights to equal protection and due process. The state moved to dismiss the action, contending it was time-barred, the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and they lacked standing. The Superior Court agreed, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the lower court’s dismissal was proper. The Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, and the continuing violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period because DEM’s denial of the permit was a discrete act, not a continuing violation. The Court further found the plaintiffs lacked standing for prospective relief because they did not allege an actual or imminent injury, as any future application might not necessarily be denied. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Majeika v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law