Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, a young woman was fatally shot on a Providence street in August 2021 while standing with her boyfriend beside her parked car. The shooting involved a dark sedan that sped by and fired multiple shots, striking the victim. The case remained unsolved for several months until, in December 2021, police stopped a vehicle for traffic violations. The defendant, seated in the rear, was among the occupants. After observing suspicious behavior and a lowered window in inclement weather, officers retraced the vehicle’s route and found a satchel containing a firearm. Forensic testing later matched the gun to shell casings from the murder scene and identified the defendant as the primary DNA contributor. Investigators also obtained incriminating information from an associate of the defendant, including phone communications linking him to the crime.After the defendant was indicted on multiple charges related to the murder and weapon offenses, he filed pretrial motions in Providence County Superior Court to suppress cell phone records obtained via search warrant and DNA evidence from a buccal swab he had consented to during police questioning. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied both motions. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of most counts, and the trial justice sentenced him to two consecutive life terms plus additional years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the cell phone warrant lacked probable cause and that his consent to the DNA swab was not voluntary.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. It held that the affidavit supporting the cell phone warrant, when considered in totality, established probable cause. It further held that the defendant’s consent to the buccal swab was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The court found no constitutional violations and upheld the convictions. View "State v. Pinkerton" on Justia Law

A fatal car accident occurred in January 2023, resulting in the death of Papa Ndoye, who was struck by a vehicle driven by a minor covered under an auto insurance policy issued by GEICO to the driver’s mother. Following Mr. Ndoye’s death, his wife, Fama Diop, sent a settlement demand to GEICO and then brought a wrongful death action against the driver and the policyholder. That wrongful death suit remained pending.Subsequently, GEICO initiated a declaratory judgment action in the Providence County Superior Court to determine its obligations under the policy, specifically whether the “each person” limit of $50,000 or the “each occurrence” limit of $100,000 applied to Ms. Diop’s claims. Ms. Diop counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that she was entitled to the statutory $250,000 minimum under Rhode Island’s Death by Wrongful Act statute. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for GEICO, holding that under Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent, including Allstate Insurance Company v. Pogorilich, loss-of-consortium and wrongful death claims that derive from bodily injury to a single person are subject to the “each person” policy limit. The court found the policy language unambiguous and declined to interpret the wrongful death statute as entitling Ms. Diop to a higher amount under the policy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the “each person” limit of $50,000 applied to all claims arising from Mr. Ndoye’s death, including derivative claims for loss of consortium. The holding was based on the clear language of the policy and controlling precedent. The judgment for GEICO was affirmed. View "GEICO General Insurance Company v. Diop" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on foreclosure proceedings involving a residential property in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased the property in 2006, executing a mortgage and promissory note with Long Beach Mortgage Company. After defaulting on the mortgage payment due July 1, 2022, Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), the mortgage servicer, sent a notice of default and right to cure by certified mail in August 2022. The mortgage had previously been assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Following further notices, including a notice of acceleration, the property was sold at foreclosure in April 2023. Plaintiffs then filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure based on purported defects in the required notices, specifically arguing that the notices failed to strictly comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage contract, which governs the notice requirements prior to foreclosure.In Kent County Superior Court, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the notices strictly complied with the contractual requirements and properly informed plaintiffs of their rights, including the right to cure and reinstate. Plaintiffs objected, asserting that the notice of default contained inaccuracies regarding the cure date and that the notice of acceleration used language that was insufficiently unequivocal with respect to their right to reinstate. The hearing justice found no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that the notices satisfied the requirements of the mortgage. Judgment was entered in February 2025.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case de novo. It held that the notice of default strictly complied with paragraph 22 of the mortgage, adequately informed plaintiffs of the required cure date, and unequivocally stated the right to reinstate after acceleration. The Court further determined that the notice of acceleration was not required to reiterate the right to reinstate in the same manner. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Diaz v. Select Portfolio Servicing" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations of breach of contract and related claims involving a credit card account that the defendant allegedly opened with a national bank. The bank claimed that the defendant opened the account, used it for purchases and cash advances, and then defaulted by failing to make the required payments, leaving a substantial unpaid balance. The defendant denied the material allegations in her answer to the complaint.After the initial pleadings, the bank moved for summary judgment in the Kent County Superior Court, asserting that there were no material facts in dispute and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Importantly, the bank’s motion was not initially accompanied by any supporting affidavits or exhibits. The defendant filed an affidavit in opposition, pointing out the lack of any supporting affidavit from the bank. On the day of the hearing, the bank submitted an affidavit by emailing it to the hearing justice’s clerk, rather than filing and serving it in accordance with procedural rules. Despite the defendant’s objections to this late submission and improper service, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, relying on the belated affidavit. Final judgment was entered, and the defendant appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court found that the bank’s failure to timely file and serve the affidavit, as required by Rule 6(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudiced the defendant’s ability to respond. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in relying on the untimely affidavit and in not postponing the hearing. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "American Express National Bank v. Perretta" on Justia Law

In the early morning of August 7, 2021, a fatal altercation occurred near West Friendship Street in Providence, Rhode Island. The defendant was present at a nightclub with friends and, after leaving, became involved in a confrontation with several individuals, including the eventual victims, Kenwins Pimental and Mario Diaz. During the altercation, the defendant was physically assaulted, claimed to have been threatened with a knife, and heard threats against his life. After escaping the initial fight, he retrieved a firearm from his car, returned to the scene, and fatally shot Mr. Diaz. He also fired at Mr. Pimental, whom he claimed had fired a gun at him, though evidence did not support that Pimental was armed.The Providence County Superior Court jury acquitted the defendant of charges related to Mr. Pimental’s death but convicted him of the second-degree murder of Mr. Diaz, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and carrying a firearm without a license. The trial justice declined the defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence did not support a heat-of-passion killing provoked by Mr. Diaz. After the verdict, the defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice erred in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Applying de novo review and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the Court held that there was not even minimal evidence that Mr. Diaz’s actions constituted adequate provocation or that the defendant acted in the heat of passion such that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was warranted. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "State v. Lacourt" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was previously convicted of second-degree robbery in 1995, stemming from an incident where he feigned injury to gain the trust of a truck driver, then stole the vehicle and some personal items after threatening the victim. He received a sentence of thirty years, with twenty years to serve, ten years suspended, and probation, as well as a consecutive five-year sentence as a habitual offender. Years later, the state alleged that the defendant violated the terms of his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behavior, based on recent conduct in which he repeatedly attempted to contact a woman and her mother through phone calls, emails, and visits to her apartment building, causing her significant fear and distress.The Providence County Superior Court held a hearing on the alleged probation violation. After hearing testimony from the complaining witness, her mother, the apartment complex manager, and a police officer, the hearing justice found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated his probation. The judge found the witnesses credible and noted the serious impact of the defendant’s conduct on the victim. At sentencing, the court considered the severity of the original crime, the defendant’s background, his potential for rehabilitation, the appropriateness of the punishment, and social deterrence. The court ordered the defendant to serve nine years of the previously suspended ten-year sentence.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. The defendant argued that the sentence for the probation violation was excessive and that the court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion and appropriately considered both the original offense and the circumstances of the violation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the nine-year sentence. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A young woman, who had been in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families, stayed at the defendant’s apartment after leaving various homes to avoid group placement. She testified that while staying with the defendant, a family friend, he sexually assaulted her at gunpoint in his car after they left the apartment together at night. Following the assault, the complainant did not immediately leave the apartment due to fear for her safety. The next morning, she confided in the defendant’s roommate, who became emotional and told her she needed to leave. She subsequently contacted her mother and was picked up by her mother, cousin, and boyfriend. She did not initially report the assault to authorities, fearing placement in a group home, but disclosed the incident to police nearly two years later.The case proceeded in the Providence County Superior Court, where a grand jury indicted the defendant for first-degree sexual assault. At trial, the complainant’s account was central to the prosecution. The defendant objected to the admission of the roommate’s statements to the complainant, arguing that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial justice overruled these objections, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant was sentenced to fifty years, with twenty-five to serve and twenty-five suspended with probation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the defendant argued that the admission of the roommate’s statements was reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the statements were not hearsay because they were not offered for their truth, but rather to explain the complainant’s subsequent actions in leaving the apartment. The Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice and affirmed the conviction. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "State v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

A federally certified organization dedicated to providing comprehensive health and social services to elderly individuals, primarily those eligible for Medicaid, relocated its operations to East Providence and sought a property tax exemption for its new location. The organization asserted that nearly all its participants are low-income elderly and claimed eligibility for exemption under a state statute that provides tax-exempt status for property used for the aid or support of the aged poor, among other categories. After purchasing the property, the organization applied for the exemption, arguing that the statutory language supported its claim. The local tax assessor denied the application, finding that the organization was not one of the specifically enumerated entities—such as a library or a nonprofit hospital—under the statute, and that its mission was not limited to supporting only the aged poor.The organization appealed this denial to the East Providence Tax Board of Assessment Review, which affirmed the assessor’s decision. Subsequently, the organization brought the case to the Providence County Superior Court, where both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court found the statute ambiguous and, applying principles of statutory construction, concluded that the exemption applied only to the specific types of entities listed in the statute, all of which must use their property exclusively for the designated purposes. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the tax assessor.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the statutory language and agreed that it was ambiguous but held that, under Rhode Island law, tax exemption statutes must be strictly construed in favor of taxation. Consequently, any ambiguity must be resolved against the taxpayer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the tax assessor. View "Pace Organization of Rhode Island v. Frew" on Justia Law

The case involves a fatal shooting that occurred during an attempted marijuana purchase in Providence, Rhode Island. The defendant accompanied a friend to buy marijuana from the decedent, who required purchasers to provide identification. The defendant entered the decedent’s car with a firearm, allegedly for protection, and a struggle ensued inside the vehicle. During the altercation, the firearm discharged, resulting in the decedent’s death. The defendant claimed that the shooting was accidental and that he acted in fear during the struggle. After the incident, the defendant returned to his friend’s car and left the scene.The Superior Court conducted a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and carrying a pistol without a license. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the trial justice made errors, including factual misstatements about his role in the events and reliance on facts not in evidence. The trial justice denied the motion, finding the jury’s verdict justified and crediting prosecution witnesses, but mistakenly referred to the defendant as a drug dealer and seller, which was not supported by the record, and referenced evidence not presented at trial.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the appeal. It found no error in the exclusion of certain testimony under the State v. Harnois line of cases. However, the Supreme Court determined that the trial justice’s mischaracterization of the defendant’s role and reliance on facts outside the evidence constituted clear error. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying the motion for a new trial and remanded the case for a new hearing on the motion for a new trial in the Superior Court. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law