Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Verizon New England Inc. (Verizon) sought review of a District Court judgment favoring Neena S. Savage, the Tax Administrator for Rhode Island. The case revolved around the interpretation of "accumulated depreciation" under G.L. 1956 § 44-13-13, which governs the taxation of tangible personal property (TPP) for telecommunications companies in Rhode Island. Verizon, a New York corporation providing telecommunications services in Rhode Island, had declared the value of its TPP based on financial accounting depreciation until 2009. After reevaluating its approach, Verizon submitted amended valuations and requested tax refunds, which were denied.Verizon requested an administrative hearing, arguing that "accumulated depreciation" should include all forms of depreciation, including physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and economic obsolescence. The hearing officer recommended affirming the refund denials, and the tax administrator adopted this recommendation. Verizon then appealed to the District Court, claiming the tax was excessive due to the incorrect calculation of accumulated depreciation.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, reasoning that the plain and ordinary meaning of "accumulated depreciation" did not include external factors like obsolescence. The court noted that the tax administrator had consistently applied financial accounting-based depreciation for forty years without legislative intervention.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court's interpretation. The court held that "accumulated depreciation" in § 44-13-13 refers to financial accounting depreciation, reflecting the value on Verizon's balance sheet. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, concluding that the plain and ordinary meaning of depreciation did not encompass market contingencies such as economic and functional obsolescence. View "Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage" on Justia Law

The case involves allegations of child molestation against the defendant, who was indicted on one count of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. The complaining witness, a minor, accused the defendant of multiple instances of molestation occurring when she was between four and eight years old. The defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. He was sentenced to a sixty-year sentence, with twenty-five years to be served, for the first-degree count, and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the second-degree count.In the Providence County Superior Court, the trial justice granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the two counts of second-degree child molestation. The jury found the defendant guilty on the remaining counts. The defendant did not file a motion for a new trial. The trial justice later sentenced the defendant, and a judgment of conviction and commitment was entered.The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the trial justice erred by allowing a medical expert to testify in a manner that impermissibly bolstered the complaining witness’s testimony. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and determined that the defendant had not properly preserved his objection to the expert’s testimony for appellate review. The court noted that the defendant failed to object to the specific questions that formed the basis of his appeal and did not move to strike the expert’s answers or request a cautionary instruction. Consequently, the court deemed the issue waived and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "State v. Lantigua" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Etleva Stratoberdha, filed a lawsuit in Superior Court against Clements Properties, LLC, Robert P. Rucando, and officials from the Town of Portsmouth. They alleged that Clements Properties caused continuous trespass by creating an illegal drainage structure, Rucando failed to disclose flooding issues when selling the property, and the Town neglected to enforce ordinances. During the prolonged litigation, Etleva filed for divorce, and the Family Court issued orders related to the sale of the marital home and the settlement of the Superior Court action.The Family Court appointed a Commissioner to sell the marital home and authorized her to settle the Superior Court action. Robert did not appeal these orders. The Family Court later approved a settlement agreement where Clements Properties would buy the marital home for $870,000, and the Town would pay $75,000 in damages. The Family Court's orders and the settlement agreement were incorporated into the interlocutory decision pending entry of final judgment in the divorce case. Robert's appeal of this decision was dismissed as untimely.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order approving the settlement agreement. The Court held that the Family Court's orders were final and could not be challenged in the Superior Court. The Superior Court's approval of the settlement agreement was a ministerial act based on the Family Court's final decrees. The Court found no merit in Robert's arguments and concluded that the Superior Court properly relied on the Family Court's orders. View "Stratoberdhav. Clements Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, purchased property at 5 Bowser Court in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), acquired adjacent property at 51 Kingston Avenue. A dispute arose when NRI's representative, John Gullison, conducted renovations and removed part of the plaintiffs' cobblestone landing, claiming it encroached on NRI's property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over the disputed land based on the doctrine of acquiescence, adverse possession, and an easement by prescription.The Superior Court awarded title to the plaintiffs for the disputed land, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired the land through the doctrine of acquiescence. The court also granted title to other abutters of Bowser Court, even though they had not requested such relief. NRI appealed, arguing that the trial justice misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence and erred in awarding title to other abutters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice erred in granting relief to the other abutters who had not requested it. The court also determined that the doctrine of acquiescence was not applicable because the disputed boundary was not solely on the parties' adjoining lots but also bordered Bowser Court. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription over the five-foot strip of land, as they had used the walkway openly, continuously, and hostilely for the statutory period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in part, recognizing the plaintiffs' easement by prescription, and vacated the part of the judgment granting relief to the other abutters. View "Urbonas v. Gullison" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 26, 2018, David Page was shot and killed while picking up acquaintances at 100 Lowell Avenue. The Providence Police Department (PPD) responded and found Mr. Page unresponsive in his car. Surveillance footage showed a black vehicle near the scene. On July 2, 2018, during unrelated investigations, police found a black Audi linked to Kennedy Terrero. Further investigation connected this Audi to the shooting. Terrero, under a cooperation agreement, testified against Jaythan Hang and Chandanoeuth Hay, implicating them in the shooting.The Superior Court jury found Hang guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy, felony assault, and firearms offenses. Hang appealed, arguing the trial justice erred in several pretrial and trial rulings, including denying a motion for severance, admitting evidence of prior bad acts, admitting statements against interest, and allowing lay opinion testimony. He also challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy count.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's decisions. The court held that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible to show motive and intent, and the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting the corroborative evidence and testimony presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Hang" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on charges including first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possessing pistols without licenses. He reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a maximum sentence of eighty years with fifty years to serve, twenty of which would be nonparolable, and a thirty-year suspended sentence. The defendant pled guilty, and the trial justice accepted the plea and sentenced him to a term of twenty years, a concurrent term of ten years, a consecutive term of twenty years without parole, a consecutive suspended sentence of twenty years, and a concurrent suspended sentence of ten years.The defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35, arguing that the trial justice misconceived material evidence and failed to consider mitigating factors. The state objected, asserting that the defendant had forfeited his right to file a Rule 35 motion as part of his plea agreement. The trial justice denied the motion, finding no grounds for relief, and the defendant appealed.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice did not demonstrate prejudice or personal bias against the defendant, and his decision not to recuse himself was proper. The court also held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion, as the defendant's sentence was below the statutory maximum and the agreed-upon cap. The court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "State v. McLean" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dino J. Guilmette, owned a property in North Providence, Rhode Island, and executed a mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation in 2006. The mortgage was later assigned to Wells Fargo, with PHH Mortgage Services as the servicing company. Guilmette requested a modification of his mortgage in 2014, resulting in a Shared Appreciation Modification Agreement. This agreement increased the principal balance and included a provision for a shared appreciation amount if the property value increased and was sold.Guilmette sold the property in 2022 and disputed the calculation of the shared appreciation amount provided by PHH. He argued that PHH's calculation was incorrect and that they overcharged him by $40,708.33. Guilmette filed a breach of contract action, claiming that PHH did not properly calculate the shared appreciation amount according to the modification agreement.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, PHH and Wells Fargo, concluding that the modification agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court found that the defendants correctly calculated the shared appreciation amount based on the terms of the agreement and the attached disclosure statement, which provided specific examples of the calculation method.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the modification agreement was unambiguous and that the defendants' calculation of the shared appreciation amount was correct. The court emphasized that the disclosure statement, which was part of the agreement and signed by Guilmette, clearly illustrated the calculation method, and there was no ambiguity in the contract terms. View "Guilmette v. PHH Mortgage Services FKA Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

Jacquelin Glassie filed a claim against the estate of her father, Donelson Glassie, alleging he breached a property settlement agreement by failing to adequately fund a trust established for her benefit. The executor of Donelson's estate, Paul Doucette, disallowed the claim, leading to a lawsuit in the Superior Court. After Jacquelin's death, her sister Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin's estate, continued the lawsuit. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment for the estate, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trustee of the trust, Wells Fargo, was the proper plaintiff. Wells Fargo then assigned its claims to Alison.A jury trial in the Superior Court resulted in a verdict for Alison, awarding her $1,164,138.43 in damages, which, with prejudgment interest, totaled $2,856,572.45. The jury also rejected the estate's counterclaim that Jacquelin had forfeited her interest under Donelson's will. The defendant, Doucette, filed a notice of appeal but failed to timely order the trial transcripts, leading Alison to move to dismiss the appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case after the Superior Court granted Alison's motion to dismiss the appeal due to Doucette's failure to timely order the transcripts and follow proper procedures for an extension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that Doucette's reasons for the delay, including hopes for mediation and cost-saving, did not constitute excusable neglect. The Court noted the extensive litigation history and the trial justice's efforts to move the case forward, concluding that the deadlines were necessary and should be adhered to. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. to their four eldest children, J.R., E.R., A.R., and D.R. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved after the fourth child tested positive for cocaine at birth in March 2016. All four children were removed from the home and never returned. The parents were referred to various programs and services, but they showed minimal progress and compliance, leading to the filing of termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions in August 2017. Despite some progress in later years, including reunification with their two youngest children through the Safe and Secure Baby Court (SSBC), the parents never progressed to unsupervised or overnight visits with the four eldest children.The Family Court terminated the parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. after a trial that spanned several weeks and included testimony from multiple witnesses. The trial justice found that the parents were unfit, that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The parents appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in these findings and in admitting the guardian ad litem (GAL) report.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decrees. The Court found that the trial justice's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, including the parents' lack of compliance with service plans and the children's need for a permanent home. The Court also held that the admission of the GAL report, although hearsay, was harmless error given the overall evidence supporting the termination. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the children's best interests and the significant progress the parents had made, but ultimately upheld the termination of parental rights. View "In re J.R.; In re E.R.; In re A.R.; In re D.R" on Justia Law

In 1995, Michael Lambert was indicted for first-degree murder and later convicted of second-degree murder and committing a crime of violence while armed. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and an additional consecutive ten-year sentence for the crime of violence. His convictions were affirmed in 1997. After being denied parole multiple times, Lambert was granted parole in 2019, effective December 2020. However, in 2020, the Parole Board amended its decision, stating Lambert should have been paroled to his consecutive sentence, not the community.Lambert filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2021, claiming unlawful detention due to the Rhode Island Department of Corrections' (RIDOC) method of calculating parole eligibility. The petition was treated as an application for postconviction relief, and the Superior Court appointed counsel for Lambert. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted Lambert's motion, ordering his immediate release on parole to the community.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to aggregate Lambert's sentences for parole eligibility, referencing its recent decision in Neves v. State, which mandated aggregating sentences for parole purposes. However, the Court quashed the part of the Superior Court's judgment that ordered Lambert's immediate release to the community, stating that the Parole Board had only paroled him to his consecutive sentence, not the community. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lambert v. Salisbury" on Justia Law