Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Michael R. and Christine O. McElroy, claimed an express or implied easement to access Seaweed Beach in Narragansett, Rhode Island, and to traverse certain private properties to reach the beach. The private properties in question are owned by Marilyn O. Stephens, Paul G. and Nancy L. Anthony, and Vivian H. Lacroix. The dispute arose when the Stephenses blocked access to their driveway, which the McElroys used to reach Seaweed Beach.In the Superior Court, the McElroys sought to quiet title to the easement, a declaration of their rights, and injunctive relief. The court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the McElroys, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated this judgment, citing unresolved factual issues. Upon remand, a bench trial was conducted, and the trial justice found that the McElroys had an express easement upon Seaweed Beach and an implied easement over the Stephens property. However, the court ruled that the McElroys did not have easements over the Anthony or Lacroix properties.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial justice's findings. The court held that the 1986 warranty deed clearly incorporated the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach. The court also upheld the trial justice's determination that the McElroys had an implied easement over the Stephens property, as it was necessary for the enjoyment of their express easement on Seaweed Beach. The court found no error in the trial justice's admission of the 1986 purchase and sales agreement as extrinsic evidence to establish the implied easement. Finally, the court concluded that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to amend the judgment, as the alleged inconsistencies did not constitute a manifest error of law. View "McElroy v. Stephens" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Warwick Wings, LLC, a Rhode Island limited liability company operating as Hooters of Warwick, faced significant damage to its building due to snow and ice in 2015. Odeh Engineers, Inc. evaluated the damage and concluded that the roof trusses needed a full rebuild. Nadeau Corporation estimated the repair costs at $1,250,000. Warwick Wings contracted Americo Mallozzi to provide architectural plans for the repairs, agreeing to pay 11% of the final construction cost, initially estimated at $137,500. Mallozzi completed several phases of the project, but Warwick Wings only paid $46,848.55 and later claimed to have terminated the contract.Warwick Wings filed a lawsuit against its insurer, Liberty Mutual, over the scope of necessary repairs. The case was settled for $785,000, but Warwick Wings did not make further payments to Mallozzi. Mallozzi then sued Warwick Wings in Providence County Superior Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking the remaining amount due under the contract. The Superior Court found in favor of Mallozzi, awarding him $63,151.45 in damages and $74,777.74 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the contract was unambiguous and called for a lump-sum payment based on the initial estimated construction cost. The trial justice's findings that Mallozzi completed 80% of the contract and that Warwick Wings breached the contract were upheld. The Court also found no error in the trial justice's award of attorneys' fees, concluding that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by Warwick Wings. View "Americo Mallozzi v. Warwick Wings, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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The plaintiff, Richard Paiva, an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), filed a suit against Lynne Corry, the warden of the maximum-security facility, in Providence County Superior Court. Paiva sought a declaratory judgment and either a writ of mandamus or an injunction based on a Department of Corrections (DOC) policy that mandates a daily minimum out-of-cell time of 8.5 hours for general population inmates, barring exigent circumstances. Paiva argued that this policy was a legislative rule with the force of law and sought declarations to that effect, along with enforcement of the policy.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that DOC policies do not create a private cause of action and that prison officials have discretion in matters affecting facility security. The defendant also contended that the DOC director, an indispensable party, was not named in the complaint. The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, leading to Paiva's appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court noted procedural issues, including the absence of transcripts from the lower court proceedings, which hindered appellate review. More critically, the Court found that Paiva's failure to join the DOC director as a defendant was fatal to his request for declaratory relief, as the director's interests would be affected by such a declaration. Additionally, the Court held that a writ of mandamus was inappropriate because the DOC policies involved discretionary functions, not ministerial duties. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Paiva v. Corry" on Justia Law

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Brian Smith was charged with simple assault and second-degree child molestation in 2015 for an incident at a Newport Polo event where he allegedly touched two children inappropriately. He was found guilty of simple assault and sentenced to two years in prison. While this case was pending, Smith was charged with second-degree child molestation in 2015 after his niece reported that he had sexually assaulted her in 2004. Smith pled nolo contendere and was sentenced to ten years, with two years to serve. In 2016, Smith faced additional charges of second-degree child molestation involving three other victims. He pled nolo contendere to two counts and was sentenced to ten years, with six years to serve.The Sex Offender Board of Review classified Smith as a level III sex offender, indicating a high risk to reoffend. Smith objected to this classification and sought review in the Superior Court. The Superior Court magistrate affirmed the board’s classification after considering various risk-assessment tools, police narratives, and Smith’s criminal history. Smith appealed the magistrate’s decision to a Superior Court justice, who also affirmed the classification, concluding that the magistrate had not erred in his decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that Smith’s procedural due process rights were not violated, as he was given ample opportunity to challenge the board’s findings. The Court also determined that the state had established a prima facie case for the level III classification using validated risk-assessment tools and other relevant evidence. Smith’s arguments regarding the improper consideration of his nolo contendere pleas and the board’s use of unsubstantiated information were rejected. The Court concluded that the board had used reasonable means to collect information and that the state’s interest in protecting the community justified the classification. View "Rhode Island Department of Attorney General v. Smith" on Justia Law

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In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters, challenged the constitutionality of a 2011 Medicare Ordinance enacted by the City of Providence, which required retirees to enroll in Medicare upon eligibility and terminated city-paid health care coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. The plaintiffs, who opted out of a settlement agreement that provided certain Medicare-related benefits, sought retroactive reimbursement for out-of-pocket health care expenses incurred during the litigation.The Superior Court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, denied relief on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews II remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the specific provisions of the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not include retroactive reimbursement for health care expenses.Upon remand, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, but the Superior Court denied this request, concluding that such relief was outside the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate in Andrews II. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that the mandate in Andrews II did not contemplate or include retroactive relief for health care expenses. The Court emphasized that the mandate was prospective in nature and aligned with the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not provide for reimbursement of past expenses. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had waived claims for individual damages during the trial and had not sought such damages in their amended complaint. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NGM Insurance Company (NGM). NEPSG had been assigned the insurance claim benefits by the policyholders, Stephen and Betty Callahan, for storm-related damage to their residence. NGM initially covered some damages but denied others, leading to a series of inspections and disagreements over the loss amount. Eventually, an appraisal process was conducted, resulting in an award that NEPSG found unsatisfactory due to updated labor costs published after the award was signed.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to NGM, finding that NEPSG was not entitled to a modification of the appraisal award or a second appraisal. The court also found that NEPSG failed to establish its claims for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. NEPSG argued that the award should be modified due to a miscalculation of labor costs and that NGM acted in bad faith by using unlicensed appraisers, among other claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the appraisal award was akin to an arbitration award and thus subject to limited judicial review. NEPSG's request for modification based on post-award labor cost updates was not supported by admissible evidence. The court also found no basis for a second appraisal or for NEPSG's claims of breach of contract and bad faith, as NGM had fulfilled its contractual obligations and there was no evidence of bad faith. Additionally, the court rejected NEPSG's claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference, finding no inequitable benefit retained by NGM and no evidence of intentional harm to NEPSG's contract with the policyholders. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. NGM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter’s Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment against the City of Providence (the city) regarding entitlement to occupational cancer disability benefits under Rhode Island General Laws chapter 19.1 of title 45, “Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters.” The Association argued that its retired members were entitled to these benefits under the state law, while the city contended that benefits should be processed under a local ordinance.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the state law applied to all firefighters, including those retired from the Providence Fire Department, regardless of the city's participation in the Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS). The court relied on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local 850, which interpreted the state law to apply broadly to all firefighters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Providence System, a comprehensive retirement benefits program established by a special legislative act, supersedes the general state statute. The court referenced its prior decision in Betz v. Paolino, which established that special legislative provisions for the Providence System prevail over state statutes of general application. Consequently, the court determined that the city is not required to process applications for occupational cancer benefits under the state law but should follow the local ordinance. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment for the city. View "The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's Association v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law