Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.D., in a residential facility appropriate for her level of need. N.D., a teenager with severe mental health issues, was under the temporary custody of DCYF. Despite the court's order, DCYF was unable to find an appropriate in-state or out-of-state placement for N.D. due to her high level of need and the lack of available facilities. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) filed a motion to adjudge DCYF in contempt for this failure.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt, rejecting DCYF's defense that it was unable to comply with the court's order. The court imposed a contempt sanction of $1,000 per day until N.D. was placed in an appropriate facility, with the sanction to be placed in a trust for N.D.'s benefit. DCYF appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Family Court. The Supreme Court found that while DCYF was in technical violation of the Family Court's order, it had demonstrated that it was literally unable to comply because an appropriate placement for N.D. was not presently within its power. The court noted the lack of appropriate facilities for girls with N.D.'s level of need in Rhode Island, staffing issues, and an increase in mental health problems among adolescents. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "In re N.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Town of Exeter in this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance, which prevented Plaintiff from developing three commercial solar-field projects in Exeter, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged several aspects of the superior court's judgment denying Plaintiff's request to enjoin enforcement of an emergency moratorium ordinance preventing review of Plaintiff's solar-field projects and to declare that Plaintiff's solar-field projects were vested pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-44. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's understanding of the relevant law, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Town. View "Green Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jessica Marie Purcell's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that Clay Johnson be removed from the Chariho Regional School Committee and ordering the Town Council of the Town of Richmond to appoint Purcell to the School Committee and denied Johnson's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that he rightfully retain his membership on the School Committee, holding that Purcell was entitled to relief.On January 19, 2023, the Town Council voted to appoint Johnson to the town's vacant seat on the School Committee to serve the remainder of Gary Ligouri's term following his resignation. Purcell brought this action seeking an order removing Johnson from the Committee and requiring the Council to appoint Purcell, as prescribed by the Town's Home Rule Charter. In response, the Town and Johnson filed an emergency quo warranto petition claiming right and title to the public office pursuant to the Chariho Act. See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 286. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed Johnson's petition and granted Purcell's petition, holding that Purcell was legally entitled to the office of Chariho Regional School Committee member. View "Purcell v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the order of the district court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Rhode Island, acting by and through the Division of Taxation (Division), in this appeal stemming from a series of transactions for the purchase and sale of gasoline, holding that the district court erred in granting the Division's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.The tax at issue was levied on a transaction between Plaintiff and another party and was the subject of several transactions between various entities. Plaintiff reimbursed a third-party for the tax assessed on the sale of 300,000 barrels of gasoline and then initiated this action alleging constitutional violations and violations of the Motor Fuel Tax. The trial judge dismissed the case for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge erroneously dismissed the action based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. View "Gunvor USA, LLC v. State, ex rel. Division of Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in his capacity as the finance director/treasurer for the Town of Smithfield, in this action challenging the calculation of a former employee's retirement benefits, holding that the court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Armand Beaudry worked as a firefighter for the Town for several years before he was placed on disability retirement benefits. The retirement benefits were governed by a pension system that constituted "an amalgamation of various documents." The case arose from a dispute over the calculation of Beaudry's benefits. Beaudry filed a complaint challenging the amount. The trial court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the hearing justice erred by finding that a challenged amendment to the plan was enforceable at the time of Beaudry's retirement, thus creating an administrative remedy that Beaudry failed to exhaust. View "Beaudry v. Rossi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham General Ordinance, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental, holding that the hearing justice did not err in her decision granting in part Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.Plaintiffs, businesses in the Town of New Shoreham that rented mopeds, filed a complaint against the Town requesting declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the Town had attempted to amend the ordinance at issue in contravention of a settlement agreement reached by the parties and in contravention of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31-19.3-5. the hearing justice granted Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of the amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the determination of the Rhode Island-Sex Offender Board of Review that Petitioner posed a level II, moderate risk of reoffense, holding that the trial justice erred in upholding the Board's classification of petitioner at a level II risk to reoffend.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the State presented a prima facie case sufficient to justify the Board's determination that he posed a level II, moderate risk to reoffend. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment below, holding that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the Board's moderate risk classification. View "State v. Decredico" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General denying Appellant's application to renew his concealed or open-carry license pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 11-47-18(a), holding that the Attorney General's decision was not based on legally competent evidence.Police officers arrested Appellant for misdemeanor simple assault after an incident involving Appellant's firearm at his place of business. Based on this charge, the Attorney General revoked Appellant's license to carry concealed weapons. While the government eventually dismissed the charge against him Appellant's subsequent application to renew his concealed-carry license was denied by the Attorney General. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that there was no legally competent evidence to support the Attorney General's decision. View "Montaquila v. Neronha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the Episcopal Diocese or Rhode Island's challenge to an order of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that permitted the Narragansett Electric Company to charge the diocese for electricity transmission costs associated with a proposed solar development project on diocese property in Glocester, holding that the matter was moot.On appeal, the diocese argued that the PUC's order was unlawful and unreasonable for several reasons, including the assertion that the PUC subjected the diocese to a biased proceeding in violation of state law. After the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the PUC for consideration of newly discovered evidence Narragansett determined that the diocese was not subject to the challenged interconnection costs. The Supreme Court declined to address the merits of the diocese's appeal, holding that the matter was moot. View "In re Petition of the Episcopal Diocese of R.I. for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law